A digital certificate serves a very simple purpose. Its job is to certify the ownership of a public key. This gives the user of the certificate the confidence that the public key has not been tampered with. Certificates are issued by a Certificate Authority (CA).
Certificates find many uses. They are crucial to the whole concept of TLS. It is used to both, encrypt a message and authenticate a message. Another area of use is email encryption.
How does a certificate look like?
Certificate: Data: Version: 1 (0x0) Serial Number: 7829 (0x1e95) Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Server CA/emailAddressfirstname.lastname@example.org Validity Not Before: Jul 9 16:04:02 1998 GMT Not After : Jul 9 16:04:02 1999 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=Maryland, L=Pasadena, O=Brent Baccala, OU=FreeSoft, CN=www.freesoft.org/emailAddressemail@example.com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) Modulus (1024 bit): 00:b4:31:98:0a:c4:bc:62:c1:88:aa:dc:b0:c8:bb: 33:35:19:d5:0c:64:b9:3d:41:b2:96:fc:f3:31:e1: 66:36:d0:8e:56:12:44:ba:75:eb:e8:1c:9c:5b:66: 70:33:52:14:c9:ec:4f:91:51:70:39:de:53:85:17: 16:94:6e:ee:f4:d5:6f:d5:ca:b3:47:5e:1b:0c:7b: c5:cc:2b:6b:c1:90:c3:16:31:0d:bf:7a:c7:47:77: 8f:a0:21:c7:4c:d0:16:65:00:c1:0f:d7:b8:80:e3: d2:75:6b:c1:ea:9e:5c:5c:ea:7d:c1:a1:10:bc:b8: e8:35:1c:9e:27:52:7e:41:8f Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption 93:5f:8f:5f:c5:af:bf:0a:ab:a5:6d:fb:24:5f:b6:59:5d:9d: 92:2e:4a:1b:8b:ac:7d:99:17:5d:cd:19:f6:ad:ef:63:2f:92: ab:2f:4b:cf:0a:13:90:ee:2c:0e:43:03:be:f6:ea:8e:9c:67: d0:a2:40:03:f7:ef:6a:15:09:79:a9:46:ed:b7:16:1b:41:72: 0d:19:aa:ad:dd:9a:df:ab:97:50:65:f5:5e:85:a6:ef:19:d1: 5a:de:9d:ea:63:cd:cb:cc:6d:5d:01:85:b5:6d:c8:f3:d9:f7: 8f:0e:fc:ba:1f:34:e9:96:6e:6c:cf:f2:ef:9b:bf:de:b5:22: 68:9f
When you open a website (using HTTPS), your browser gets a similar certificate from the server (the website).
The first check the browser does is regarding the validity of the certificate (the Not Before and the Not After part). If the current time does not fall between these two timestamps, your browser will crib.
The second check is for the Common Name (CN). It is the FQDN of the owner of the certificate. If the website you are accessing does not match this CN (“www.freesoft.org” in this case), your browser will crib.
Note: If you want the same certificate to support multiple domains, you can use wildcards. Here is an example of Google’s certificate supporting wildcard (it will apply to “anything.google.com”):
Why would you (your browser) trust this certificate?
Because it has been signed by another CA! We will come to why you’ll trust this CA later, but for now let’s assume that you do trust this second CA. This CA will have its own certificate which we will be using to the validate the first certificate. This secon certificate will also look similar to the one shown at the top.
Let’s authenticate this certificate!
Now comes the fun stuff. Our job is to verify only one thing – that the signature (mentioned at the bottom of the certificate) is actually genuine. Let’s verify this!
In the first certificate, the Signature Algorithm is mentioned as md5WithRSAEncryption. This signifies that the second CA took the MD5 hash of the first certificate, and encrypted it using RSA (which is an asymmetric algorithm). The encryption was done using their (the second CA’s) private key. The result of this MD5 followed by RSA is what is called the certificate’s signature (which, again, you can see at the bottom of the certificate).
Now, all your browser needs to do is, decrypt the signature (using the second CA’s public key from their certificate), extract the MD5 hash of the (first) certificate from it and finally match this hash with an independently computed MD5 hash of the (first) certificate.
If the hashes match, it proves that the certificate has not been tampered with. Or, in other words, it has been properly signed! Hence, I mentioned in the beginning that our only job is to prove the authenticity of this signature (since it implicitly guarantees that the certificate has not been, maliciously or otherwise, modified).
Easy, wasn’t it? 🙂
Chain of Trust
Now, let’s revisit our question – why would you trust the second CA? It all about the chain of trust.
It’s quite simple actually. You blindly trust the certificate you receive (from the website), verify its authenticity (signature) using the issuer’s (second CA’s) certificate. Now, you need to verify the authenticity of the second CA. For that, you fetch its issuer’s (third CA’s) certificate, and authenticate. This chain goes on all the way to the top CA. The top CA’s certificate is called Root Certificate.
Now, imagine, that you trust the root CA’s certificate. This implicitly authenticates the certificates of all the CA’s in the chain of trust, doesn’t it? This leads us to (the final) question.
Why trust the Root Certificate?
In the second image (Google’s partial certificate), you can see the chain of trust. At the root is the GeoTrust Global CA. Your browser blindly trusts this CA’s certificate. This is because root level certificates are already part of you browser/OS they are shipped!
Just one line here: certificates provide (among other things) a very simple mechanism to authenticate someone’s public key.
Why do you need to authenticate someone’s public key? Read the “Why would you trust my public key?” part in my previous blog.